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2010 年 11 月 1 日，创业板首批 28 家上市公司迎来股权解禁之日。自
此，创业板上市公司高管（包括董事、监事和高级管理人员）减持拉开了
序幕，并且减持之风愈演愈烈，在 2011 年 3 月、5 月、11 月先后迎来高管
减持高峰。根据深圳证券交易所公开披露数据的统计结果显示，创业板上


































The restricted shares of 28 first-batch GEM listed companies began to 
circulate on the secondary market in November 1, 2010. Since then, senior 
managers, including directors, supervisors and managers, arose the wave of 
selling shares, and got more and more intensive. Later, the peak of shares 
reduction came up one by one in March, May and November of 2011. 
According to the disclosure of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we found that the 
senior managers had sold 3 billion of shares during the last 13 months. However 
the shares that senior managers have bought are only worth 2million. As to the 
GEM which have just set up for only 2 years, how will the frequent shares 
reduction of senior managers affect the stock market?  This is a meaningful 
question. 
Firstly, this thesis analyze the market reflection mechanism on senior 
managers’ shares reduction from the view of principal-agent and asymmetric 
information theory, and then study on the events of senior managers’ shares 
reduction of GEM listed companies. By method of event study, it shows 
significantly negative cumulative abnormal return(CAR) , which means the 
stock market reacted negatively after senior managers’ share reduction. 
Later, based on the empirical evidence from market reflection of senior 
managers’ shares reduction, we look into the determinants of market reflection 
(CAR) due to senior managers’ shares reduction by multiple linear regression. 
The regression results show that the nature of controlling shareholder, company 
size, the governance of the board make an effect on the CAR from senior 
managers’ shares reduction. Specifically, senior managers of state-owned listed 
company earn more CAR from shares reduction than private listed company. 














lower CAR senior managers get from shares reduction. 
Finally, this thesis proposes some suggestions on the regulation and 
operation of GEM, based on the evidence from empirical study. It is necessary 
to make information disclosure strict and weaken the information advantage of 
senior managers, as well as improve the management of shares reduction 
behavior of senior managers. Besides, it also seems meaningful to strengthen 
the supervision of state-owned listed companies and perfect the corporate 
governance structure. 
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1.1 研究背景与问题  






泛关注。经过两年多的快速发展，截止 2012 年 2 月 10 日，我国创业板已
有 287 家上市公司，总发行股本 40,505,240,492 股，上市公司总市值达
720,715,096,244 元。 
2010 年 11 月 1 日，创业板首批 28 家上市公司上市满一年，迎来限售
股解禁之日。当日，大禹节水（股票代码 300021）董事聂根红减持近 65 万
股、套现 1144 万元拉开了创业板高管（包括董事、监事和高级管理人员）
减持的序幕。随后，在 2010 年 11 月期间，大禹节水先后遭到六名高管的
26 次减持，减持金额总计逾 4743 万元。在此期间，大禹节水遭遇高管疯狂
减持并不是创业板市场的个例，南风股份（股票代码 300004）、华测检测
（股票代码 300012）、网宿科技（股票代码 300017）、吉峰农业（股票代
码 300022）、华星创业（股票代码 300025）、华谊兄弟（股票代码 300027）
等在限售股解禁后也先后出现多名高管减持上市公司股票。从 2010 年 11
月至今，高管减持成为创业板股票市场的一种常态，每个月均有发生上市
公司高管减持套现，并且在 2011 年 3 月、5 月、11 月等月份迎来减持高峰。
根据东方财富网披露的创业板上市公司高管股权变动交易量显示：2010 年
11 月至 2011 年 12 月，创业板高管及其相关人员（主要是配偶、父母、子















持 6.33 亿元，2011 年 11 月减持 6.27 亿元；而高管及相关人员增持仅为
7358.67 万元，且增持部分主要来源于高管的相关人员（主要是配偶、父母、
子女）增持股票，高管个人增持仅有 200 万元。高管持股变动图 1-1 如下： 
 
数据来源：东方财富网（http://data.eastmoney.com/executive/） 





























1.2 研究思路与框架  
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